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ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A, Standard of Review, 
Given the nature and content of Wheeler's brief, it seems pertinent to restate the 
relevant standard of review applicable to the district court's summary judgment ruling. 
Summary judgment is only appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). "Furthermore, 
because disposition of a case on summary judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the 
merits, we must review the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the losing party." Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (emphasis added). 
Much of Wheeler's argument in its brief consists of merely raising additional 
evidence which it contends supports its position rather than demonstrating that there are 
no material facts in dispute. Such an approach is entirely inappropriate at the summary 
judgment phase. It is irrelevant whether there is evidence in the record that supports 
Wheeler's position or whether reasonable inferences from that evidence could be 
construed to support Wheeler's position. The sole issue is whether, while construing all 
evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the City, 
there are no genuine issues as to any material fact. That is clearly not the case. 
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B. Wheeler Statement of Facts is Replete With Disputed Material Facts. 
• Paragraph 4: The City has cited evidence in the record showing that Wheeler was 
responsible for installation of the exhaust system, including the thimble, and the 
creation of a support for the mufflers on the roof are facts in dispute. (R. at 329-
30, 333-35, 339-42, 349, 380-83, 385-86.) 
• Paragraph 5: The City has cited evidence in the record showing that Wheeler was 
invited to, and did in fact, participate in the meetings and discussions regarding the 
generator sets and exhaust system. (R. at 327-28, 343-46.) Mr. Spears was 
specifically identified as having been present at construction meetings. (R. at 392-
395, 398.) 
• Paragraphs 6-7: The City has cited evidence in the record showing that Wheeler 
participated in the discussions and decision to place 4x4 wooden supports on the 
roof. (R. at 327-28, 343-46.) 
• Paragraph 8: The City has cited evidence in the record showing that Wheeler hired 
and paid Richard Carlson to create the metal cradles for the mufflers under its 
direction. (R. at 339-42, 349.) 
• Paragraph 9: The City has cited evidence in the record showing that invoices paid 
by Wheeler included work in installing the rain caps. (R. at 329-30, 380-83, 85-
86.) 
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• Paragraphs 10-11: The City has cited evidence in the record showing that 
Wheeler instructed Mr. Carlson to make the rain cap fit within the framework. (R. 
at 322-35, 339-46,349.) 
• Paragraph 12: The City has cited evidence in the record showing that Mr. Carlson 
was directed to invoice Wheeler for his work in installing portions of the exhaust 
piping and for modifying and installing the rain cap. (R. at 380-383.) 
II. THE CITY'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
A. The District Court Never Reached the Issue of the Products Liability 
Statute of Limitations in its Summary Ruling. 
The City did not address the issue of the products liability statute of limitations in 
its opening brief for the simple reason that the district court did not reach the issue in its 
summary ruling. Wheeler claims in its brief that the product liability statute of 
limitations issue "was fully explored by the district court and was the primary basis for its 
dispositive ruling." (Appellee Br. at 12.) This is a gross distortion and 
mischaracterization of the district court's summary judgment ruling. In reality, the 
district court merely stated as follows: 
To the extent that Plaintiffs claim that Defendant negligently 
installed a modified DME thimble rain cap and an 
oversized/overweight muffler'5 may constitute a product liability 
claim, it was filed too late and is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
(R. at 481) (emphasis added). The district court never concluded that the City's 
negligence claim did in fact constitute a product liability claim. It simply stated that if 
the negligence claim were merely a product liability claim based on a product defect, it 
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would be untimely. The fact that the district court never reached the product liability 
issue in its summary ruling is further supported by the total absence of any analysis or 
discussion of the issue whatsoever in the body of the summary ruling. The sole reference 
to the products liability issue in the summary ruling is the language quoted above. 
What Wheeler fails to address in its brief is the fact that the district court did fully 
explore the products liability issue in a previous dispositive ruling on Wheeler's motion 
to dismiss. In that ruling, the court stated: 
The parties to this case agree that the generators themselves were not 
defective. Rather the problem alleged by ULGT relates to the 
installation of the generators into the building. While the generators 
themselves were non-defective, the installation of the non-defective 
generators may have been performed in a manner which would be 
considered negligent, if the generators were installed too close to 
wooden supports, resulting in the fire. If the installation of the 
generators was done negligently and a dangerous condition resulted, 
that did not make the generators a defective product. Regardless of 
the fact that the installation was done by Defendant., who was also 
the manufacturer of the product installed, the product itself was not 
defective. Plaintiff has not alleged a strict products liability case, 
and Plaintiff may proceed with its negligence claim. 
(R. at 88) (emphasis added). That ruling was never appealed by Wheeler and stands as 
the only definitive holding on the products liability issue in this case. Wheeler is simply 
attempting to relitigate an issue that was already decided correctly by the district court— 
without the bother of actually appealing the ruling—by mischaracterizing the court's 
holding in its summary ruling and improperly raising an issue before this Court that is not 
the subject of the current appeal. 
Furthermore, even if the district court did in fact revisit its products liability ruling 
in its summary ruling, which it clearly did not, the language of the relevant paragraph 
611 330281 v2 4 
mentions only to the City's negligent installation claims. (R. at 481.) It does not address 
the City's claims of negligent testing or training or any of its breach of contract claims. 
Therefore, regardless of whether the court's summary ruling constitutes an affirmative 
holding that the City's negligent installation claim is a products liability claim, the City's 
remaining claims for negligent testing and training and all of its breach of contract claims 
would remain intact. 
B. The City's Claims are Not Product Liability Claims. 
The district court correctly held in its ruling on Wheeler's motion to dismiss that 
the City's claims were not disguised product liability claims and were not governed by 
the product liability statute of limitations. This ruling is perfectly in line with previous 
holdings and precedent by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The primary case relied upon by the district court in its ruling denying Wheeler's 
motion to dismiss was Conger v. Tel Tech., Inc. 798 P.2d 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Wheeler failed to address this case at all in its opening brief. The plaintiff in Conger 
raised both negligence and strict product liability claims, this Court upheld the trial 
court's decision to grant a directed verdict on the issue of product liability while allowing 
the negligence claim to go to the jury. The holding in Conger is fatal to Wheeler's 
argument that the products liability statute of limitations governs all related causes of 
action arising out of the same set of operative facts. 
The case of Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115, 61 P.3d 1068, casts the fatal blow 
to Wheeler's statute of limitations argument. At issue in Alder was the negligent 
installation, testing, and servicing of an x-ray machine and exhaust system. IdL 1fl[ 1-2. 
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The Alder defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that the case was merely a 
disguised products liability case, subject to the two-year statute of limitations. Rejecting 
that argument, the Utah Supreme Court held the district court was correct in denying the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment because no allegation was made that the 
machine was defective or unreasonably dangerous when purchased. Id. fflf 21-23. 
Because the plain language of the Utah product liability statute does not preclude 
common law negligence claims, the Court held that district court was correct in 
concluding that "'this is a negligence case only'" to which the four-year negligence 
statute of limitations applies. Id^f 21 (citing Slisze v. Stanlev-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, 979 
P.2d317). 
Alder is directly on point. As the district court noted, the City does not contend 
that the machinery supplied by Wheeler was defective. Rather, the City alleges that 
Wheeler's installation and testing of the system were negligent and a breach of contract. 
This is simply not a products liability claim. It is a common law negligence and breach 
of contract claim. Wheeler attempts to distinguish Alder on the sole basis that the 
machine at issue in Alder was not new as were the machines at issue in the present case. 
This is difference without a distinction and does not alter the fact that both Alder and the 
present appeal involve issues of negligent installation and testing, not product defects. 
Wheeler's sole support for its product liability argument consists of an irrelevant 
defamation case and a handful of other cases decided well before Alder and Slisze that do 
not have similar factual circumstances to the case at hand. Wheeler cites Strickland v. 
General Motors Corp., 852 F. Supp. 956 (D. Utah 1994), McColling v. Svnthes., Inc., 50 
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F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1122 (D. Utah 1999), and Bishop v. Gentech, Inc., 2002 UT 3, f 26, 48 
P.3d 218) for the proposition that Utah's two-year statute of limitations for products 
liability claims also governs other claims arising out of allegations of a "product defect." 
The City does not dispute this. However, in direct contrast to the facts of those three 
cases, the City's claims against Wheeler do not arise out of a product defect. The City's 
claims arise solely out of Wheeler's negligent installation and testing of its non-defective 
products and its failure to meet its contractual obligations to properly install and test 
those products and to train the City's employees. In none of the cases cited by Wheeler 
were any allegations made against the manufacturer for improper installation, testing, or 
training. Each of the claims in those cases, however styled, arose out of a product defect. 
Of particular note is the fact that all three of these cases cited were decided prior to 
Alder and to the Slisze case relied on by the Utah Supreme Court in Alder. In Alder and 
Slisze, the Utah Supreme Court directly held that the plain language of the Utah product 
liability statute does not preclude common law negligence claims or, consequently, 
subsume those claims under the product liability statute of limitations. Any suggestion 
by Wheeler that the cases it cited dictate a contrary result cannot be sustained given the 
subsequent rulings in by Alder and Slisze. 
The only other case cited by Wheeler in support of its statute of limitations 
interpretation is Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, a defamation case. This case brings 
nothing new to the debate. Nothing in Jensen alters the fact that claims of negligence or 
breach of contract arising out of the negligent installation or testing of a non-defective 
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product do not fall within the products liability statute of limitations, as directly and 
repeatedly held by the Utah Supreme Court. 
III. THE CITY'S CLAIMS AGAINST WHEELER ARE NOT DEFEATED BY 
THE RETAINED CONTROL DOCTRINE. 
As with its product liability arguments, Wheeler makes sweeping and 
unsupportable assertions that the retained control doctrine alone defeats all of the City's 
claims against Wheeler. In reality, the retained control doctrine has a highly debatable 
impact on this case and clearly has no possible application whatsoever to the City's 
claims against Wheeler for negligently failing to start-up, inspect, and test the system and 
to train the City's employees or to its breach of contract claims. 
A. The Retained Control Doctrine Does Not Defeat the City's Claims 
Against Wheeler for Negligent Installation. 
Wheeler admits that the work performed by an independent contractor, Richard 
Carlson, when he installed the rain cap within the framework was the cause of the 
damage suffered by the City. (Appellee Br. at 14.) Wheeler wrongly suggests, however, 
that it cannot liable, as a matter of law, for Mr. Carlson's negligent work under the 
retained control doctrine because it did not "exercise affirmative control over the method 
or operative detail of that work" or "actively participate" in the performance of that work. 
Id (citing Johnson v. Dep't of Transp., 2004 UT App 284, Tf 16, 98 P.3d 773; Thompson 
v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 1ft 15-26, 979 P.2d 322). 
The retained control doctrine has no legal application to the City's negligent 
installation claims against Wheeler. Wheeler undertook to render services to the City by 
installing key components of the exhaust system, which undertaking imposed a duty upon 
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Wheeler to the City. Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115, 61 P.3d 1068, 1077. To fulfill 
its duties to the City, Wheeler hired an independent contractor, Richard Carlson, and 
entrusted the installation work to him. However, in so doing, Wheeler did not, and 
legally could not, dispose of its preexisting duties owed to the City. Wheeler therefore 
owed duties of care to the City entirely independent of any duties that might also have 
been imposed upon Wheeler through application of the retained control doctrine as Mr. 
Carlson's employer. 
In direct contrast, in none of the retained control cases cited by Wheeler was the 
injured party owed any duties by the defendant separate and apart from any duties 
potentially imposed through application of the retained control doctrine. The sole issue 
in those cases, then, was whether the retained control doctrine should be applied to 
impose a duty—and therefore liability—on the employer that did not otherwise exist, due 
to the employer's affirmative control or active participation in the work of the 
independent contractor. Because Wheeler already owed a duty to the City by virtue of its 
undertaking to properly install key components of the exhaust system, the question of 
whether the retained control doctrine imposed additional duties on Wheeler is entirely 
irrelevant to the City's negligent installation claims. 
Even if the retained control doctrine were legally relevant to the City's negligent 
installation claims, the facts and evidence in this case simply do not support Wheeler's 
contention that it would not apply. In Smith v. Hales & Warner Constr., Inc., 2005 UT 
App 38, <|[ 9, 107 P.3d 701, this Court explained that, in reference to the retained control 
doctrine, a "typical instance in which such an exertion of control might occur is when a 
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principal contractor entrusts a part of the work to subcontractors, but himself or through a 
foreman superintends the entire job." Such is the case at hand. Wheeler entrusted its 
installation work for the City to Mr. Carlson. The City has pointed to ample evidence in 
support of its claims that Wheeler exercised affirmative control over Mr. Carlson's work 
and actively participated in the discussions and instructions surrounding his work. 
Specifically, Wheeler hired and paid Mr. Carlson to install the muffler framework on the 
roof and directed him to modify and install the rain caps in close proximity to the wooden 
supports for the framework. 
• Mr. Carlson testified that Mr. Spears told him Wheeler would be paying for 
some of the installation of the system. Mr. Carlson further testified that he 
submitted invoice 99-643 to Wheeler for installing the exhaust piping 
through the roof and thimble, which included his work on the rain cap. Mr. 
Carlson further testified that he did not submit invoices to the City for 
anything to do with the exhaust system or specifically the rain cap. (R. at 
380-83, 85-86.) 
• Mr. Spears testified that he hired Mr. Carlson to do the work that was 
required by Wheeler and was responsible for paying Mr. Carlson's 
invoices, none of which were disputed by Wheeler. (R. at 329-30, 333-35.) 
Invoice 99-643 was specifically for Mr. Carlson's work on the rain caps. 
(R. at 380-83.) Invoice 99-643 says "verbal Randy and Don." "Randy" is 
Randy Dowse of Wheeler, suggesting Wheeler's approval of Mr. Carlson's 
work on the rain caps. (R. at 403.) 
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• Mr. McPherson testified that Mr. Johnson told him that Wheeler had 
directed the modifications to the rain caps made by Mr. Carlson. 
Specifically, when told that the rain caps did not fit within the muffler 
framework, Mr. Spears told Mr. Johnson to tell Mr. Carlson to "make it 
fit." (R. at 322-25.) Mr. Spears testified that he spoke to Mr. Johnson on a 
daily basis about installation issues with the system. (R. at 331-33.) Mr. 
Carlson testified that upon discovering that the rain caps did not fit within 
the muffler framework, Mr. Johnson told him to "make it fit." (R. at 268-
69.) 
• Mr. McPherson also testified that his understanding from conversations 
with Mr. Johnson was that "Wheeler contracted with the welder [Carlson] 
to make those modifications" to the rain caps. (R. at 322-25, 343-46.) 
Wheeler responds to the City's evidence and arguments simply by pointing to 
other evidence it claims supports its position. At best, Wheeler's response simply 
demonstrates that there are numerous material facts in dispute on this issue that must be 
weighed by a jury and are not a proper basis for summary judgment. Summary judgment 
is only appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). That is 
obviously not the case here. This is particularly true in light of the summary judgment 
standard, requiring that the facts alleged by the City, and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, be viewed in a light most favorable to the City 
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B. Wheeler is Liable for its Negligent Testing of the Exhaust System and 
Training of the City's Employees and for Breach of Contract. 
The retained control doctrine has no relevance whatsoever to the City's claims 
against Wheeler for negligently failing to fulfill its duties to start-up and test the system 
and to train the City's employees on operating of the system. Wheeler admits that it did 
not hire Mr. Carlson or anyone else to perform these duties. According to Wheeler, the 
only work Wheeler hired Mr. Carlson, to perform was to fabricate and install exhaust 
pipe and flanges. (R. at 301.) Thus, regardless of whether the retained control doctrine is 
relevant to the issue of Mr. Carlson's negligent installation of the rain cap, it is entirely 
inapplicable to the City's remaining negligence claims against Wheeler. 
The retained control doctrine is likewise irrelevant to the City's breach of contract 
claims against Wheeler. The retained control doctrine is a negligence-based doctrine that 
has no applicability to breach of contract claims. Wheeler remains liable to the City for 
any damage resulting from a breach of its contractual duties, regardless of whether it 
delegated or entrusted those duties to a third party. 
Because Wheeler failed to properly fulfill its duties to start-up and test the system 
and to properly train the City's employees in operation of the system, Wheeler remains 
liable to the City under a negligence theory and breach of contract claim, regardless of 
any application of the retained control doctrine to these claims. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DISMISSED THE CITY'S 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM AGAINST WHEELER, 
A. The Existence of Written Contract is Irrelevant to the City's Breach of 
Contract Claim. 
Wheeler needlessly wastes an entire section of its brief arguing that there was no 
written contract between Wheeler and the City, while never bothering to refute the City's 
claims that a contract nevertheless existed between the parties. Wheeler also fails to 
specifically counter the City's arguments that a binding contract existed with Wheeler by 
virtue of the parties performance. (Appellant Br. at 24.) Given the deposition testimony 
of its employee, Robert Spears, that a contract did in fact exist between the parties, it 
would be difficult at the very least to do so. (R. at 320-21, 322-23.) 
Wheeler remaining arguments about what duties Wheeler had regarding 
installation merely go to the weight of the evidence in the record, not the question of 
whether there is any evidence supporting the City's claims.1 This fact is made clear by 
Wheeler's concluding statement that "any suggestion that the April, 1999 proposal 
required wheeler to install or be responsible for the installation of the exhaust system and 
the thimble is totally contradicted by the facts of the case as contained in the Record." 
(Appellee Br. at 18.) In making this argument, Wheeler completely misses the point of 
this appeal. The question is not whether the evidence supporting the City's contract 
claims might possibly be contradicted by other evidence in the record. The sole issue 
before this Court is simply whether there are disputed issues of material fact concerning 
It should be noted that once again Wheeler's arguments focus exclusively on the 
installation issues while ignoring the testing, inspecting, and training issues. 
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the City's claims against Wheeler. In making that determination, the Court must 
construe all of the evidence, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, in a light most 
favorable to the City. Pointing out contradictory evidence simply is not relevant at the 
summary judgment phase. 
B. Wheeler Did Not Properly Raise the City's Breach of Contract Claim 
in its Summary Judgment Motion. 
Wheeler's scattered references to a contract in its summary judgment 
memorandum are plainly insufficient to contest the City's breach of contract claims, 
particularly in light of the fact that three of the references were in Wheeler's fact section, 
one was in an introductory sentence, and the other in a conclusory statement. Nowhere 
in its analysis did Wheeler even mention the word contract, let alone address the 
elements of a breach of contract claim. 
Wheeler's first passing reference to a contract came in its fact section, wherein 
Wheeler simply stated that there was no written contract between the parties. As 
explained above, this is irrelevant to whether a contract existed between the parties. In 
that same section, Wheeler then asserted that changes and revisions were made to 
Wheeler's written bids, mostly orally, and that many of the items outlined in its written 
bids were not performed. Again, those statements do nothing to challenge the City's 
breach of contract claim, let alone challenge the existence of the contract itself as 
Wheeler did in its subsequent reply brief. 
Finally, Wheeler also mentioned the breach of contract claim at the beginning of 
its negligence analysis and once more at the end of that analysis. However, the analysis 
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itself focused exclusively on issues of negligence, duty, and retained control, none of 
which are relevant to a breach of contract. Nowhere in its analysis did Wheeler even 
mention the elements of a breach of contract claim or argue that any of those elements 
had not been met. Wheeler never denied the existence of a contract with the City, never 
denied the City's claims that the contract included inspection, commissioning, and 
training of the system, and never denied the fact that it did not inspect or test the system. 
In fact, Wheeler admitted that it had never tested the system or even gotten up on the 
roof of the building to inspect the system. 
The City's breach of contract claims are not, as Wheeler suggests, merely a 
rephrasing of its negligence claims and cannot be. They cannot be properly raised by 
mere passing references to the word "contract" here and there without any meaningful 
analysis of the claim itself. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
WHEELER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS UNCONTROVERTED. 
A. The City Disputed All of the Key "Undisputed" Facts Asserted by 
Wheeler with Evidence from the Record. 
At pages 9 through 13 of its Opening Brief, the City sets forth the record evidence 
submitted in the trial court to place in dispute the key facts supporting Wheeler's Motion 
for summary Judgment. Among others things the record evidence establishes Wheeler's 
involvement in the decision to place the 4x4 wooden timbers on the roof of the building 
to support the weight of the mufflers, Wheeler's involvement in directing modification of 
the rain cap, and generally Wheeler's involvement with the work involved in this case. 
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(Appellant's Br. at 9-13.) The record evidence supporting the City's position with regard 
to those facts derives from the testimony of several individuals and documents. Contrary 
to Wheeler's assertion in its Brief, the evidence disputing the factual basis for Wheeler's 
Summary Judgment does not depend entirely on the testimony of Mr. McPherson. To the 
contrary, even absent Mr. McPherson's testimony, those facts remain disputed based 
upon the record evidence. 
Other than its discussion of Mr. McPherson's testimony, however, Wheeler tacitly 
concedes that the record evidence submitted by the City places in dispute the factual basis 
for its Motion by failing to even address the evidence submitted by the City. Wheeler's 
extended discussion of Mr. McPherson's testimony, attempting to convince the Court that 
Mr. McPherson's testimony constitutes inadmissible hearsay, is therefore irrelevant to 
ultimately deciding whether record evidence disputed the facts underlying Wheeler's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, which is the real issue for decision. In light of the 
undisputed existence of such evidence, the determination of whether or not Mr. 
McPherson's testimony constitutes hearsay is irrelevant. 
B. The Trial Court's Hearsay Ruling Regarding Mr. McPherson's 
Testimony Was Incorrect As A Matter Of Law. 
The trial court determined that two statements made by Mr. McPherson 
constituted hearsay and were inadmissible. The first statement is a statement Mr. 
McPherson heard Mr. Johnson, a city employee, make concerning a statement made to 
him by Mr. Spears, a Wheeler employee. The second statement is a statement made by 
Bill Rose and/or Bob Spears, both of whom are employees of Wheeler, which statement 
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was heard by Mr. McPherson. Neither of those statements are hearsay under Rule 801(d) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
1. Mr, McPherson's Statement Concerning The Statement Made 
By Wheeler's Employee, Mr. Spears, To The City's Employee, 
Mr. Johnson, Is Not Hearsay. 
The trial court determined that Mr. McPherson's statement concerning the 
statement made by Mr. Spears to Mr. Johnson constituted double hearsay and was 
inadmissible. As Wheeler argues, "[t]his statement would be admissible only if both of 
the two hearsay components of the statement independently came under one of the 
hearsay exceptions identified in the Utah Rules of Evidence." (Appellee's Br. at 23.) In 
fact, both of the potential hearsay components of Mr. McPherson's statement come 
within the exceptions set forth in Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and, as such, 
Mr. McPherson's statement is admissible. 
a. Mr. Spear's Statement to Mr. Johnson. 
First, it is clear that Mr. Spear's statement to Mr. Johnson is admissible as an 
admission by a party opponent. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2). There is no dispute that Mr. 
Spears was a representative of Wheeler, that his statements were made in the course and 
scope of his employment by Wheeler, or that his statements related directly to his job 
duties. As such, the statements made by Mr. Spears are admissible party opponent 
admissions. Beehive Telephone Co. v. TSC 2004 UT 18, fflf 39-40; State v. Worthen, 
765 P.2d 839, 847 (Utah 1988). Rather, Wheeler's argument is that because Mr. 
McPherson was not present and did not participate in the statement made by Mr. Spears 
he cannot testify with regard to that statement. Wheeler relies for that argument on 
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Richards v. Lake Hills, 389 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Utah 1964). Richards does not stand for that 
proposition. 
A review of the Richards decision discloses that it stands simply for the general 
proposition that an exception must exist for hearsay testimony to be admitted as evidence 
under the Utah Rules of Evidence. In Richards, an employee of the defendant, Mr. Don, 
was asked about statements made to him over the telephone by another employee of 
defendant, Mr. Merrill. The object of eliciting that testimony was apparently to impute to 
the plaintiff, through its agent Mr. Richards, who was allegedly with Mr. Merrill at the 
time the content of those statements. The Court correctly found that the statements from 
one of the defendant's employees to another were hearsay. Because Mr. Don could not 
testify as to whether Mr. Richards heard the statements, or what his reaction was, he 
could not testify to that issue. Wheeler's argument that this case stands for the 
proposition that one must be present in order to testify as to an admission by a party 
opponent is simply incorrect. 
Mr. Spears made his statement to Mr. Johnson in his capacity as a Wheeler 
employee, and the statement he made is an admission by a party opponent under Rule 
801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That statement is therefore not hearsay and is 
2
 Wheeler also cites in its brief Utah v. Sharifpour, 2005 UT App 42, in which an 
individual was asked to testify as to what a declarant "meant" by a statement made. In 
that case, the Court found it relevant that the testifying party had "personal knowledge of 
the matter" since he was being asked not only to relate what had been said, but also "his 
understanding of what [to be declarant] meant by the statement." Id. In this case, Mr. 
McPherson has not purported to testify as to what Mr. Spears or Mr. Johnson meant. He 
has simply testified as to the statements made by those individuals. 
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admissible through Mr. Johnson. Nothing held by the Court in Richards requires a 
different conclusion. 
Moreover, Mr. Spears has denied making the statement to Mr. Johnson and 
evidence to the contrary is admissible pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence as a prior statement by Mr. Spears. Contrary to Wheeler's arguments, at the 
time Mr. Johnson spoke to Mr. McPherson he had personal knowledge of Mr. Spears 
statements from speaking with Mr. Spears. Mr. McPherson has personal knowledge of 
what he was told by Mr. Johnson and can testify to such statements from personal 
knowledge. So long as Mr. Spears statement as related to Mr. McPherson by Mr. 
Johnson is not hearsay there is no issue under Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987), on which Wheeler relies, actually supports 
McPherson's ability to testify to the statements made by Mr. Johnson.3 
b. Mr. Johnson's Statement to Mr. McPherson. 
Had Mr. Spears made his statements directly to Mr. McPherson there would be no 
question that those statements are admissible under Rule 801(d)(1) and (2) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Because those statements were made to Mr. Johnson and only 
subsequently related to Mr. McPherson, a separate and independent exception to the 
hearsay rule must exist concerning Mr. Johnson's statement to Mr. McPherson in order 
In Calamity, a witness to a crime wrote a report which included a statement purportedly 
made by another person present. When he did not recall matters set forth in that 
statement at trial, the court admitted the prior statement into evidence under Utah R. 
Evid. 801(d)(1), and this Court found no prejudicial error. Here, Mr. Spears has 
forgotten or denies his prior statement and that statement, as related to Mr. McPherson, is 
offered under that same rule. 
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for those statements to be admissible. Such an exception exists under Rule 801(d)(1) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In his testimony, Mr. McPherson has offered specific prior statements made by a 
declarant, Mr. Johnson, which the declarant has now forgotten. Under Rule 801(d)(1): 
A statement is not hearsay if: (1) Prior statements by a witness. A 
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) 
inconsistent with declarant's testimony or the witness denies having 
made the statement or has forgotten it. (Emphasis added.) 
Mr. McPherson personally heard Mr. Johnson's statements and can testify to what 
he heard under Utah R. Evid. 602. The jury can obviously weigh that testimony together 
with the examination of Mr. Johnson at trial. Consequently, Mr. McPherson's 
recollection of Mr. Johnson's statements is not hearsay under the foregoing rule as it is 
offered as a prior statement of Mr. Johnson as a witness. 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Spear's statements to Mr. Johnson are admissible 
under Rule 801(d)(1) and (2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Mr. Johnson's statements to 
Mr. McPherson are admissible under Rule 801(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. As 
such, those statements do not constitute hearsay, are admissible, and should have been 
admitted by the trial court in consideration of Wheeler's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. Mr. McPherson's Testimony Concerning Statements He Heard 
Made By Mr. Rose And Mr. Spears Are Admissible As 
Admissions Of A Party Opponent. 
Mr. McPherson testified that he heard a conversation involving Mr. Rose and/or 
Mr. Spears, both known to him to be employees of Wheeler, and in that conversation 
those individuals were discussing the installation of the 4x4 timbers as additional trusses. 
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Mr. McPherson testified that it clear was to him from that conversation, which he 
personally heard, that Wheeler was involved with regard to that installation. Wheeler 
argues that Mr. McPherson has provided insufficient foundation for those statements to 
qualify as admissions of a party opponent, an exception to the hearsay rule. In fact, Mr. 
McPherson's testimony shows the opposite to be true. 
For a statement to be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence simply requires a showing of a statement made by a party or by its 
representative in the course or scope of that representatives agency or employment. State 
v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988). It is established and not disputed that Mr. Rose 
and Mr. Spears were employees of Wheeler involved in this project. (R. at 196, 344-45.) 
The statements heard by Mr. McPherson and related in his testimony were made by Mr. 
Spears and/or Mr. Rose concerning this project in which they were involved on behalf of 
Wheeler. The fact that these admissions were made at a time subsequent to the actual 
installation of the trusses is of no moment. An admission by the employees of Wheeler 
relating to matter within the scope of their employment that Wheeler was involved in that 
installation meets the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
VI. MR, MCPHERSON'S TESTIMONY RAISES MATERIAL ISSUES OF 
FACT. 
Wheeler makes a variety of rather disjointed arguments in support of its 
proposition that Mr. McPherson's testimony does not raise material issues of fact. First, 
Wheeler incorrectly states that the City admitted in its opening brief that "Utah contract 
law would not place any responsibility on Wheeler unless it directed the manner and 
611:330281 v2 21 
nature of the work of its subcontractors." (Appellee Br. at 36.) Wheeler is again 
confusing apples and oranges. As explained in detail above, the retained control doctrine 
is not relevant to any of the City's claims and most definitely not to its negligent testing 
and training claims or its breach of contract claims. To the extent that it is applicable to 
the negligent installation claims, Wheeler would be liable to the City for Mr. Carlson's 
negligent installation not only if it controlled his work but also if it "actively 
participated" in the performance of his work. Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, fflf 15-26, 
979 P.2d 322. 
Wheeler then argues that even if Mr. Spears did direct Mr. Carlson to "make it 
fit," such direction would not constitute "control" over Mr. Carlson. In doing so, 
Wheeler pulls a slight of hand, switching from its allegations about the City's 
"admissions" over whether Wheeler "directed" Mr. Carlson's work to arguments about 
whether Wheeler "controlled" his work. In reality, as noted above, the standard set forth 
in Thompson v. Jess merely requires that the employer "actively participate" in the 
performance of the work. Id. 
The remainder of Wheeler's arguments about Mr. McPherson's testimony are 
simply attempts by Wheeler to construe the evidence presented in its own favor and to 
ignore any evidence that contradicts its claims. Once again, Wheeler loses sight of the 
fact that the issue at hand is not whether there is evidence that could be construed to 
support Wheeler's position or contradict the City's position. The standard for summary 
judgment requires the Court to construe all of the evidence, and the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the City in order to determine whether there 
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are disputed issues of material fact concerning both the City's negligence claims and 
breach of contract claims against Wheeler. Wheeler can quibble all it wants to about 
alternative interpretations about the evidence presented and how inferences could be 
drawn in favor of its position, but that is simply not the proper standard to be applied at 
the summary judgment stage. 
VII. THE CITY'S CLAIMS ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
AND THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
Wheeler repeatedly makes sweeping allegations in its brief that the City has 
attempted to raise new facts in the appeal. However, the only specific fact that Wheeler 
points to is the purported allegation that Wheeler was "the mastermind behind the 
decision to put 4x4 timbers on the roof." (Appellee Br. at 39.) Such a claim is yet 
another example of Wheeler's blatant mischaracterizations. The portions of the City's 
brief to which Wheeler cites in support of its exaggerated claim simply do not say what 
Wheeler says they do. The City never claimed in its brief that Wheeler was solely 
responsible for the decision to place the wooden supports on the roof. Rather, as the City 
noted repeatedly in its brief, the weight of the mufflers supplied by Wheeler required the 
use of 4x4 wooden supports. Wheeler was aware of, and involved in, the decision to use 
those supports. 
Contrary to Wheeler's arguments, there is ample evidence in the record to support 
the City's claims that Wheeler not only knew about the use of the wooden supports but 
was also involved in the decision to use the wooden supports. Wheeler's optimistic 
assertion that there is "no testimony" supporting the City's claims about Wheeler's 
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involvement is belied by its admission later in the same paragraph that Mr. McPherson 
testified in his deposition that he overheard conversations about Wheeler's involvement 
in the decision to use the wooden supports. (Appellee Br. at 39.) More specifically, Mr. 
McPherson testified that he knew that "Wheeler was involved in the selection of the 
4x4s" as support for the mufflers. He further testified that "there was some conversations 
between the City and perhaps other contractors and Wheeler that arrived at a decision to 
put some 4x4s up there." Mr. McPherson testified that he heard Wheeler personnel say 
that the plan to use the wooden 4x4 supports was "a decision that Wheeler was engaged 
[in]." (R. at 343-46.) 
Wheeler's argument that no Wheeler representative was physically present at a 
meeting where the wooden joists were discussed is simply irrelevant given the testimony 
of Wheeler's own employee, Robert Spears, that he was in daily contact with the City 
and its agents regarding the problems encountered during installation of the generators 
and exhaust system. (R. at 331-33.) Mr. Spears specifically testified that, in September 
or October of 1999, his correspondence with Mr. Johnson probably included questions 
about "what are the joists going to be and things like that that need to be known to apply 
a thimble to it." (R. at 327-28.) 
VIII. THE CITY RAISED THE ISSUE OF WHEELER'S TESTING AND 
TRAINING OBLIGATIONS BELOW. 
In its Opposition to Wheeler's Motion for Summary Judgment, the City 
repeatedly disputed Wheeler's claim that its only duty to the City was to supply the 
generator sets and parts for the exhaust system, expressly noting that Wheeler also had 
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duties to start-up, commission, and test the entire system and to train the City's 
employees. (R. at 294, ^ 1; 296, ^ 5; 311, H 35.) In his deposition, Wheeler's own 
employee, Mr. Spears, testified that Wheeler's "commitment" as "part of the contract 
that Wheeler contracted for" was to "start-up, commission and test the entire system for 
customer acceptance." Mr. Spears also admitted that training was "part of the contract 
package that Wheeler was providing to the city of Hurricane." (R. at 320-21, 322-23.) 
Wheeler's own expert, Mr. McPherson, likewise testified in his deposition that 
Wheeler's training obligations were a component of its duties and contractual obligations 
to start-up, commission, and test the entire system: 
Part of your start-up and commission responsibilities are training the 
operators that are going to be left with the system. Had Wheeler had 
the involvement that they should have had with this project all along, 
including with adequate training of the people at Hurricane, then I 
believe this fire would not have occurred. 
(R. at 347-48, 50-51) (emphasis added). Consequently, any reference to Wheeler's 
duties to start-up, commission, inspect, or test the system necessarily include the 
obligation to train the City's employees on the system, as was made clear in the City's 
opening brief. 
CONCLUSION 
When viewing the evidence, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, in a light 
most favorable to the City, it is clear that the district court improperly granted summary 
judgment to Wheeler. There are numerous disputed issues of material fact remaining. 
The Court must therefore reverse the trial court's dismissal of the City's claims against 
Wheeler. 
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